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BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Court of Appeals by 
Rule 26(2) (a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Title 78 
Chapter 2a, Section 3(2)(f), Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended) and by Article VIII, Section 5 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes are 
provided in Addendum A of the Defendant/Appellant's Brief: 
1. Salt Lake City Code § 12.24.100. 
2. Salt Lake City Code § 12.52.350. 
3. Salt Lake City Code § 12.52.360. 
4. Art. I, Sec. 7, Utah Constitution. 
5. Amend. V, United States Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(b), 
the plaintiff and appellee will not present an independent 
Statement of the Issues. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
BELOW 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(b), 
the plaintiff and appellee will not present an independent 
Statement of the Case. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 10, 1994, Officers Kenneth D. Dailey, Jr. 
and Roger K. Williams of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department Motorcycle squad were on duty in the vicinity 
of State Street and approximately 1900 South Street in 
Salt Lake City. R.81,137. The officers' attention was 
drawn to large gold or yellow sedan. R.82,137. The 
officers observed that vehicle make a U-turn, travel 
across a raised island, and commit other traffic 
violations. R.82,137. 
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The officers were on motorcycles at the time, riding 
side by side. R.82,85. The officers were headed 
northbound on State Street in the area of 1900 South State 
Street. R.83. The suspect vehicle was initially headed 
southbound. It then crossed the raised traffic island and 
moved into the northbound middle lane. The vehicle then 
weaved again onto the traffic island with its two left 
wheels going up onto the traffic island and then back down 
again into the left traffic lane. R.83. When the vehicle 
made its U-turn it was approximately 2-4 car lengths from 
the oncoming motorcycle officers. R.84. 
When the vehicle was in the center northbound lane and 
moved into next inner lane, it did not give any signal of 
intention to turn. R.84. The movement from the middle 
lane to the next lane was almost immediately subsequent to 
the U-turn. R.84. This next lane was the left turn bay. 
R.86. The vehicle moved into the turn bay and stopped. 
R.86,138. No traffic control device controlling the left 
turn bay was present at the intersection. R.87. The 
vehicle remained in the turn bay for a period of time even 
though there was time for it to proceed in front of 
oncoming traffic. R.86,138. During that period of time 
the suspect vehicle could have turned left safely, but did 
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not. R.86,138. Instead the vehicle remained stationary 
until a southbound oncoming car almost got to the 
intersection. R. 86,138. At that point in time, the 
suspect vehicle turned in front of the oncoming car, 
failing to yield to it. R. 86-87,138. That car had to 
brake and yield to the suspect vehicle as it made its left 
turn. R.86,138. The officers turned on their lights and 
sirens, and the oncoming southbound vehicle yielded to the 
officers as they followed the suspect vehicle in an 
attempt to get it to pull over. R.87,138. 
The suspect vehicle turned left onto Coatsville 
Avenue. R.88. The officers followed almost to the end of 
Coatsville, which placed the suspect vehicle nearly to 
Main Street. R.88. At that point, the suspect vehicle 
pulled over. R.88. The vehicle traveled nearly three-
quarters of a block down Coatsville. R.88. As it traveled 
down the street there were opportunities for it to pull 
over. R.88. As the vehicle traveled down the block, the 
driver made movements in the vehicle other than holding 
the steering wheel. R.88. Officer Dailey could see the 
driver's shoulders dipping down and his head dipping down. 
R.88. Officer Williams testified that it looked as though 
the defendant was reaching over to the passenger side of 
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the car and then back and under the driver's side of the 
car. R 139. This raised officer safety concerns. R.88. 
It also raised concerns about evidence. R.89. 
When the vehicle was stopped, "the driver exited the 
vehicle immediately and then leaned up against the 
vehicle." R.90. The officers dismounted from their 
motorcycles and approached the driver. R.90. There were 
no passengers in the vehicle. R.90. As Officer Dailey 
began his initial contact he could smell a "real heavy 
odor of alcohol", 'strong and distinct". R.90. The 
driver's eyes were observed to be red and watery. R.91. 
The driver's speech was "very slurred". R.91. When the 
officer asked the driver whether he had been drinking, the 
driver initially responded the he had had nothing to 
drink. R.91. After arrest, the driver admitted to having 
had one drink. R.91. The driver was identified as the 
defendant, David Lee McClain. R.93. 
Officer Dailey asked the defendant to perform field 
sobriety tests ("FST's"). R.93. The officer was only able 
to administer two FST's to the defendant. R.94. This was 
due to the uncooperativeness and heavy impairment of the 
defendant. R.95. The officer started with the Horizontal 
Gaze Nystagmus Test ("HGN"). R.95-97. The officer noted 
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during the test that the defendant was noticeably swaying 
in all directions. R.98. Officer Williams observed the 
FST's and noted that the defendant had a "definite problem 
with balance". R.142. 
The next FST administered was the nine-step walk and 
turn ("WAT"). R.99. The defendant was instructed to 
assume the instructional position for this test, but was 
unable to stay in that stance. R.99. The defendant said 
"I can't." R.99. Described as "real agitated", the 
defendant also grabbed Officer Dailey's wrist and told the 
officer that he wanted to go home. R.99. Officer Williams 
testified that the defendant was "cyclic", going through 
cycles of different attitudes and behaviors. R.156. The 
defendant' s emotions ran the spectrum from congenial and 
polite to almost physically violent. R.156. Officer 
Williams testified that this was very characteristic of 
numerous intoxicated persons that he had dealt with in his 
seven years in law enforcement. R.156. 
Both officers reached the conclusion that the 
defendant was sufficiently impaired to be arrested for 
driving under the influence of alcohol. R.100,143. The 
defendant was arrested for that offense and for the other 
traffic offenses. R.100. After being arrested and 
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handcuffed, the defendant said "I take so much medication 
it's not funny." R.100. This was an apparent reference to 
medications taken for diabetes. R.102,132. When first 
asked whether he was sick or injured, he responded no. 
R.132. The reference to diabetes and medication for it 
came later. R.132. The defendant testified that he had 
diabetes and high blood pressure. R.157. He testified 
that the diabetes caused him to have pain in his 
extremities. R.158. The defendant testified that when his 
blood sugar gets too low his speech slurs, he gets 
disoriented, shaky, and can go unconscious. R.158. 
Further, he testified that this affects his coordination 
and equilibrium. R.158. He testified that he regularly 
took medications for his diabetes. R. 161,166. He 
testified that he also took pain killers and a medication 
for the nerves in his legs. R.166. The defendant asserted 
that all medications were prescription. R.166. He 
testified that he had previously gone unconscious due to 
his diabetes. R.163. The defendant also testified that at 
least one of the medications he took had an advisory 
against operating machinery: "[The medication] says be 
careful. Use caution when you1re driving or operating 
machinery." R.16 9. 
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The defendant's vehicle was impounded and searched 
pursuant to standard procedure. R. 143. Officer William's 
search uncovered "an open quart bottle of beer in a brown 
bag" under the front driver's side seat. R. 143. That 
bottle felt cold to the touch, and contained an amber 
liquid. R.144. That liquid "looked like beer", "Smelled 
like beer", and "had the consistency of beer when dumped 
on the ground". R.154. That bottle "had the cap on it but 
the seal had been broken and approximately two-thirds of 
the beer [was] gone." R.144. The officer also found two 
open beer cans with a small amount of fluid still in them 
in the back seat. R.143-44. 
The defendant was then asked to submit to an 
Intoxilyzer test. R.100. The defendant was read the 
standard State admonitions. R.101. The defendant's 
response to the request was: "No. My doctor will kill 
that." R.101. 
The first reference in the trial transcript to the 
defense witness' availability comes at the conclusion of 
the first prosecution witness' testimony, when the court 
decided to break for lunch. R.133-134. This would have 
been at approximately 12:30 p.m., as the court indicated 
that the court would reconvene at two o'clock, providing a 
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break of almost an hour and one-half. R.133. At that 
time, the court indicated that its understanding was that 
the witness had informed the defense that he would not be 
available until four o'clock in the afternoon. R.134. 
The court asked whether the witness had been 
subpoenaed, "as witnesses usually are." R.134. Defense 
counsel's response was: "Actually, I don't think, I ever 
did subpoena him. I talked to him and he assured me that 
he would be here at four o'clock, but I didn't subpoena 
him. " R.134. 
The court stated that it was cognizant of the fact 
that the defendant wanted the witness to testify, and that 
defense counsel felt that the witness was an important 
one. R.134. The court indicated that it was willing to 
take witnesses out of order, break at odd times, or 
anything else it took to accommodate the witness' 
schedule. R.134. The court indicated that if all other 
testimony ended "shortly before four", that the court 
would be willing to take a recess and give the witness an 
opportunity to come at four o'clock. R.134. (emphasis 
added). The trial court indicated that it was not willing 
to have the jury sit around for an hour if testimony ended 
at three o'clock. R.134. The court indicated that it was 
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not reasonable to have all parties involved wait an hour 
or more for a witness. R.135. The court also indicated 
that the witness needed to be present earlier if possible. 
R.135. 
Defense counsel argued that if the defense had 6 or 10 
important witnesses which would lengthen the trial that 
the court would have granted a continuance. R.135. 
Defense counsel acknowledged that the jurors might be 
required to sit around for an hour or more, but argued 
that it was important to his client's right to a fair 
trial to have the witness testify. R.135. The judge 
responded that if there were 6 or 10 witnesses the trial 
would not be done in one day. R.135. The court indicated 
that if the trial were scheduled for two days, there would 
be more latitude to accommodate the defense request. 
R.135. The court recognized that the parties had other 
commitments the next day. R.135. 
The court pointed out that if the defense wanted a 
witness present, that witness should have been subpoenaed. 
R.13 6. Further, that witness was required to appear at a 
time that was reasonable for everybody, including the 
jurors. R.136. The court also expressed concern over the 
prejudicial effect a defense delay might have on the 
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defendant, where the jury would know the reason for the 
delay and influence the jury decision. R.136. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
No abuse of discretion occurred when the trial judge 
denied the defendant's request for a recess. The defense 
had been aware of the schedule problems of its witness. 
With that knowledge, the defense could have taken steps 
prior to trial to accommodate the witness' schedule 
without imposing on the court. 
The defendant's ability to defend himself was not 
compromised by the trial court's decision, but by a 
failure to take appropriate action prior to the date of 
trial. The witness was not subpoenaed. The defense 
points to no efforts prior to trial to provide notice to 
the court or the prosecution that the witness would not be 
available until late in the day. 
The request was unreasonable in light of the failure 
to subpoena, seek a continuance, or at a minimum provide 
notice to the court and seek its approval prior to the 
date of trial. 
Since the basis for denying the recess can be 
attributed to the defense, it was not an abuse of 
1 1 
discretion for the trial court to deny the subsequent 
request to reopen the case. 
Denial of the request for a reckless driving lesser 
included offense was not improper. Under either the 
"necessarily included" or the "evidence based" standard, 
the instruction should not have been included. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF THE DEFENSE 
REQUEST FOR A SHORT RECESS DID NOT VIOLATE THE RIGHT 
TO FAIR TRIAL AND TO DUE PROCESS. 
Due process rights, and the right to a fair trial, 
should not be read to permit a defendant to escape his own 
responsibility to present a defense. The defendant cites 
State v. Maestas, 815 P.2d 1319 (Utah App. 1991), as 
support for the proposition: "An important part of due 
process of law, and the right to a fair trial, is an 
'opportunity to defend.'" Defendant's Brief at 6 
(hereinafter "DB"). In the context of exclusion of alibi 
testimony in a criminal trial, Maestas held that the 
defendant's due process rights were not violated. Maestas, 
815 P.2d at 1324-25. The defendant in Maestas "did not 
comply with the statutory requirements of filing a notice 
12 
of an alibi witness." Maestas, 815 P.2d at 1324. The 
Court stated: 
Defendant had the opportunity to present alibi 
testimony. All he needed to do was comply with 
the timing requirements of section 77-14-2. The 
witness, whose testimony was excluded in this 
case, did not suddenly materialize during the 
trial. She was known to the defendant from the 
outset of the case. * * * * 
Maestas, 815 P.2d at 1325. 
The defendant also cites Provo Citv v. Werner, 810 
P.2d 469 (Utah App. 1991), as support. DB at 6. In the 
context of independent testing in DUI trials, Provo Citv 
held that "all that is required to provide due process is 
an opportunity to obtain an independent test." Provo Citv 
810 P.2d at 472. The basis for the ruling was that the 
defendant had made an "inadequate effort" to obtain an 
independent test: "Defendant, not the police, was 
responsible for her failure to obtain a second test." Id. 
In both Maestas and Provo Citv the failure of a 
defendant to take measures to ensure the availability of 
evidence at trial did not constitute a due process 
violation. The defendant here points to no attempts prior 
to trial to ensure the timely presence of the witness. 
The defendant appeared on the date of trial expecting the 
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trial court to accommodate the witness' schedule without 
so much as subpoenaing the witness to ensure his 
appearance. Other alternatives were available. 
Prior to trial, the defendant could have sought a 
continuance to a date accommodating the witness' schedule 
and the trial court and other parties. The defendant 
could have made a pretrial motion requesting prior 
authorization for the late appearance of the witness to 
provide the court and other parties with notice of the 
potential problem. There is no indication that the 
defendant made any such attempts. Where the defendant 
failed to make reasonable efforts prior to trial which 
could have resolved the scheduling problem, the trial 
court's denial of a recess at trial becomes all the more 
reasonable. Since the defendant's efforts here were 
inadequate, no due process violation of the right to a 
fair trial should be found. 
State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750 (Utah 1982), sets 
forth the criteria regarding continuances: 
It is well established in Utah, as elsewhere, 
that the granting of a continuance is at the 
discretion of the trial judge, whose decision 
will not be reversed by [the Utah Supreme Court] 
absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Abuse 
may be found where a party has made timely 
objections, given necessary notice and made a 
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reasonable effort to have the trial date reset 
for good cause. 
Creviston, 646 P.2d at 752 (citations omitted). The City 
submits that these same criteria should be applied 
irrespective of whether the defendant's request is 
characterized as a recess or a continuance. While the 
defendant' s request was for a break in the trial not 
extending to another date, the fact that the defendant 
knew of the potential problem before the date of trial 
subjects the defendant's request to the continuance 
analysis. The defendant makes no reference to any 
pretrial attempt to provide notice or a reasonable effort 
to have the trial reset. Without such a showing, it was 
not a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the trial 
court to deny the request for a recess. 
Beverly v. Cardinal, 743 P.2d 442 (Colo.App. 1987), is 
distinguishable from the case presently before the Court. 
There, the appellate court reversed the trial court's 
decision to deny the request for a continuance in the 
nature of a recess and remanded for a new trial. Beverly, 
743 P.2d at 444. However, one of the factors crucial to 
the Beverly court was the fact that the witness there had 
been properly subpoenaed to appear before the trial court. 
Id. The witness here was not subpoenaed. Therefore, 
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under the "totality of the circumstances" suggested by the 
Beverly court, no abuse of discretion occurred in the 
present case. Id. 
People v. Spears, 474 N.E.2d 1189 (N.Y. 1984), can 
also be distinguished. There, unexpected circumstances 
which occurred at trial provided the basis for reversal on 
appeal. The defendant's counsel "requested a brief delay, 
after the codefendant testified and rested unexpectedly, 
to consult with his client about taking the stand, 
implicating defendant's fundamental right effectively to 
confer with his counsel." Spears, 474 N.E.2d at 1190. The 
"brief delay" in Spears consisted of a request to continue 
to the next morning where the request was made at five 
minutes to five at the end of a trial day. That request 
was denied by the trial court. Next, defense counsel 
requested a "few minutes" to speak with his client. The 
trial court interrupted defense counsel after five 
seconds, demanding that the defense proceed. Instead the 
defense rested, and the court recessed for the day. 
Spears, 474 N.E.2d at 1190. The unexpected circumstances 
in Spears should be distinguished from those presently 
before the Court. In Spears, the defense request was due 
to unexpected circumstances. The situation with Mr. 
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McClain's witness was not unforeseen. The doctor had told 
defense counsel that he was not available until 4:00 
o'clock, and defense counsel proceeded to trial with that 
knowledge, without notifying the court or the prosecution, 
and without seeking alternative solutions. 
Mr. McClain was not denied his right to due process 
and to a fair trial due to the actions of the trial court. 
Any such infringement resulted from the defense failure to 
utilize available options to remedy the time concerns. It 
was manifestly incorrect for the defense to assume that 
the trial court would just have to wait for its witness. 
Where the defense does not assert alternative procedural 
avenues to protect its constitutional rights, the defense 
should not be heard to complain that the court turns a 
deaf ear to its problem. 
Not only would the jury have been required to serve 
longer, but every other player in the trial: the judge, 
the prosecution, the court clerk, and the other witnesses. 
The time of these other parties to the proceedings is 
dismissed all too lightly by the prosecution. If the 
witness was so important to the case, surely he merited a 
subpoena. Surely the witness merited an attempt at 
continuance to accommodate both his busy schedule and the 
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trial court's. The right to a fair trial does not entitle 
the defense to disregard the time of others involved. 
Especially where there were reasonable alternatives prior 
to trial. 
The defendant asserts that "[t]he witness was 
identified, and he was going to be present to testify at 
the end of the requested recess." DB at 9. While the 
defense assertion that the witness was going to appear did 
prove true, at the time the request was made, the trial 
court had no such assurance. While a subpoena is no 
guarantee a witness will appear, the defense had not 
bothered to send a subpoena to the witness. The trial 
court was asked to recess for an hour for a witness the 
defense had not even bothered to subpoena. The 
defendant's witness was a physician, presumably subject to 
the scheduling problems and emergencies of such 
professionals. There was simply no guarantee the 
defendant's witness was going to appear. The uncertainty 
suggests the trial court's decision not to recess was all 
the more reasonable. 
The defendant cites Rutzen v. Pertile, 527 N.E.2d 603 
(Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1988). This case is also 
distinguishable. Here the late witnesses were delayed 
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beyond the trial court's deadline by flight delay and 
inclement weather. Rutzen, 527 N.E.2d at 608. 
The defendant also cites Great Plains Supply Co. v. 
Erickson, 398 N.W.2d 732 (N.D. 1986). "A trial court 
abuses its discretion when it acts in an unreasonable, 
arbitrary, or unconscionable manner." Great Plains, 398 
N.W.2d at 734. The trial court here did none of the 
above. It was unreasonable for the defense to assume that 
a trial court would, as a matter of course, grant a recess 
on the date of trial where the defense has had prior 
notice of the particular problem and has not provided 
prior notice of it to the court. Any unconscionable or 
arbitrary action should be charged to the defense. 
The defendant presents the Slavenbura factors for this 
court's consideration. Slavenbura v. Bautts, 561 P.2d 423 
(Kan. 1977) . Defendant' s Brief at 11. The City would 
submit that the gateway element of those factors should be 
emphasized here. The gateway factor is that of "counsel's 
diligence and effort to gain attendance of the witness". 
Slavenbura, 561 P.2d at 428. 
Defendant's counsel did not subpoena the witness. 
Defendant's counsel relied on the representations of a 
busy professional that he would be present at a time 
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certain. The trial court indicated that it would be 
willing to make reasonable accommodations to the expert's 
schedule, i.e., taking the expert out of turn, etc. 
However, requesting the trial court to recess for an hour 
The defendant's counsel asserts the expense of subpoena as 
a rationale for not subpoenaing this particular witness. 
It is absurd to argue the expense of subpoena where that 
should be offset against the cost one hour of judicial 
time, prosecutorial time, prosecution witnesses, and jury 
expense, court clerk. The defendant is not entitled to 
delay where the defendant had less burdensome alternatives 
available. 
The defendant had a number of alternatives which were 
not explored. First and foremost was the option of a 
continuance prior to the date of trial. The defendant 
could have requested either by stipulation or by order of 
the court a continuance of the trial date to ensure the 
expert's timely appearance. This would have involved 
ascertaining the expert's schedule in advance and 
obtaining a trial date which coincided with the expert's 
schedule such that other participant's in the proceedings 
would not have been imposed upon. 
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Further, there is no suggestion in the record that the 
defendant had consulted with the City or the trial court 
as to whether they had any objections to the defendant's 
expected manner of proceeding prior to the date of trial. 
The next Slavenburg element or factor is the reason 
the witness is not present. Slavenburg, 561 P.2d at 428. 
The witness was apparently unavailable due to the expert's 
busy professional schedule. The nature of the expert's 
practice [medicine] becomes a valid basis on which to deny 
the defendant's request for recess. There is simply no 
way to assure that a unsubpoenaed witness will appear, let 
alone a busy medical professional. The defendant was 
asking the court to recess for at least one hour when 
there was no assurance the expert would appear, even at 
the time represented by the defendant. 
The defendant attempts to argue that the testimony of 
the expert might have shortened the ultimate time of the 
trial. Such speculation should be disregarded. 
The next element is the nature of the expected 
testimony. Slavenburg, 561 P. 2d at 428. The defendant 
proffered that the expert was going to testify that the 
defendant did indeed have diabetes. DB at 12. The city 
never challenged the assertion that the defendant suffered 
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from diabetes. The defendant further proffered that the 
expert would have testified that "a diabetic suffering 
from low blood sugar can become disoriented, have slurred 
speech and have trouble with his motor coordination." DB 
at 12. The City never challenged the defendant' s 
assertion that he was taking medication or that it 
affected him in the manner he testified. The expert would 
not have been able to testify from personal knowledge that 
the defendant had not consumed alcohol that night. The 
significance of the expertfs testimony to the verdict is 
overstated. 
As to the element of the criticality of the expected 
testimony (Slavenburcr, 561 P.2d at 428), the real question 
is why, if this testimony was so crucial to the 
defendant's case, (a) the expert was not subpoenaed or (b) 
if there was any doubt regarding the expert's timely 
appearance the defendant did not seek a continuance. It 
is not appropriate for the defendant to claim evidence or 
testimony was crucial where the defendant has not taken 
all available steps to ensure that testimony is heard 
prior to the date of trial. 
The defendant asserts that the expert's testimony as 
to medication would have been "crucial". Again, the 
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defendant overstates the importance of the expert's 
testimony. Where alcohol, illegal medication, or 
prescribed medication can provide a basis for a conviction 
of driving under the influence, the expert's testimony 
would have added little. The defendant asserted that he 
took prescribed medication and that it affected him in 
certain ways. The defendant asserted that he reacted in 
specific ways to his diabetes. The City did not challenge 
the defendant's assertions in this regard. The City could 
have argued, even with the expected expert testimony, that 
the defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol 
and/or legal medications. 
The fact a person's prescription medication interacted 
with alcohol provides a basis for conviction. The expert 
would not have been able to testify as what alcohol the 
defendant consumed that date. There was at least no 
proffer on this point (i.e., no independent blood alcohol 
content testing). 
Regarding the element of expected delay (Slavenburcr, 
561 P.2d at 428), while defendant's counsel assured the 
court that the expert would appear at 4:00, and in fact, 
the expert did appear, the defendant was in actuality 
requesting the trial court to delay the proceedings for a 
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witness that might not appear at all or might appear 
subsequent to the 4:00 timeframe. Thus, defendant placed 
the trial court in the position of delaying the trial for 
a minimum of an hour with no assurance, other than verbal 
assurances, that the wit would in fact appear. This is in 
fact a substantial burden in light of the common knowledge 
that medical professionals are subject to changes in 
schedule at any given time. Simply put, the defendant was 
asking the court to wait one hour when the expected expert 
could well have been delayed, putting the court to an 
hour's delay based on a mere hope. 
As to the element of the effect of the delay on the 
docket of the trial court (Slavenburg, 561 P.2d at 428), 
the defendant asserts that the requested delay "would not 
have had any effect on the docket of the trial court". 
The "only possible effect" was not a 50 minute longer 
trial. The delay could have been granted by the court, 
only to have the witness not appear due to an emergency. 
The witness may have appeared on time, and due to the 
delay, the trial might have been required to have been 
continued to another day. Since all parties (prosecution, 
defense, and trial court) had other commitments and 
responsibilities, such a delay would have imposed a 
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considerable burden on the parties concerned. This is not 
to even address the imposition on the jurors or to the 
city's witnesses if the trial was continued to the next 
day, or another day later on the calendar. This would 
have raised other issues of continuity, potential 
hostility of jurors to the party responsible for the 
continuance, etc. If the trial was continued to another 
date, where the expert was required, the expert's busy 
schedule would again be of concern. 
All of this could have been avoided had the defendant 
simply requested, prior to the trial date, a continuance 
to accommodate the expert•s schedule or discussed the 
issue prior to the date of trial with the other affected 
parties.. 
As to the element of the overall injustice which might 
result if the delay were denied (Slavenburcr, 561 P.2d at 
428) , any resulting "overall injustice" was self-imposed, 
and therefore should not be grounds for reversal. 
Even where the request is characterized as a 
continuance, no abuse of discretion occurred here. The 
defendant simply failed to make "a reasonable effort to 
have the trial date reset for good cause" and failed to 
exercise "due diligence". State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 
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750, 752 (Utah 1982) (Cited in Defendant's Brief at 14). 
Presenting a witness problem to the trial court on the 
date set for trial, without prior notice, does not 
constitute a reasonable effort or due diligence where the 
basis of the problem was known to the defendant in advance 
of trial. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT DENIED THE REQUEST TO REOPEN THE CASE. 
After the defense rested, the City released its 
witnesses. R.191. Therefore it would have been improper 
for the trial court to allow the defense to reopen its 
case. This would have denied the prosecution the ability 
to recall those witnesses if the defense witness' 
testimony merited it. 
It is not difficult to imagine how the police 
officer's testimony would have been relevant subsequent to 
the defense witness testimony. While the officers were 
not medical experts, their personal knowledge of the 
events of that night would have served as the underlying 
facts on which any medical expert's opinion would have 
been based. Thus, their testimony regarding their 
observations of the defendant would have been crucial in 
answering the assumptions and opinions of the medical 
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expert, who was without personal knowledge of the facts 
specific to the date of the offense. 
Denial of the request to reopen was not capricious or 
arbitrary under the circumstances in this case. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE PROPERLY DENIED THE 
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE 
INSTRUCTION. 
Initially, the City would contest that "reckless 
driving" is a lesser included offense of driving under the 
influence. As the defendant notes in his brief, both 
offenses are class B misdemeanors. DB at 19. The City 
would submit that these offenses are alternative offenses. 
Further, there is a distinction between reckless driving 
"willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or 
property" and the DUI willful or intentional operation of 
a vehicle under the influence of alcohol. 
The issue of jury instructions here parallels the 
situation in State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983). 
The defendant here did not deny that the driving offenses 
observed occurred. In Baker, the defendant did not 
challenge the unlawful entry, leading the Utah Supreme 
Court to observe that "the only disputed factual issue is 
his intent." Baker at 160. Thus intent became the focus 
of the appellate analysis there: 
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Intent must always be inferred from 
circumstantial evidence. The defendant argued at 
trial that his intoxication prevented him from 
forming the required intent. However, the only 
evidence of intoxication showed that the 
defendant was not seriously enough incapacitated 
by his drinking to cause the police to give him 
field sobriety tests. This is not a sufficient 
quantum of evidence to warrant an instruction 
regarding the defendant's capacity to f orm an 
intent. Even if it were, the defendant's theory 
would not support the giving of an instruction on 
criminal trespass, an offense which itself 
requires a specific intent. The thrust of the 
defendant's evidence on intoxication was to 
negate any specific intent at all, not to prove 
the existence of one of the intents necessary for 
criminal trespass. 
Baker at 160. 
The intent required for DUI is different from that 
required for reckless driving. The intent required for 
"reckless driving" is "wilful or wanton disregard for the 
safety of persons or property." The intent required for 
DUI is general - simply "willfully" operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence. The DUI ordinance and 
statute do not refer to a specific mental intent. 
Therefore the mental intent required is that set forth 
under the general provisions for criminal responsibility. 
Defendant McClain's theory of the case was that he was 
suffering from a diabetes-related disorientation. R.177-
82. Such a theory of the case does not support the giving 
of an instruction on "reckless driving". The defendant 
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argued that he was suffering from a diabetes-related 
disorientation. If so, he would have been incapable of 
forming the requisite intent for reckless driving: "wilful 
or wanton disregard". The defendant did not testify that 
he had intentionally driven in a reckless manner. The 
defendant did testify that he could not remember. The 
defense argued that the defendant was disoriented as a 
result of his diabetes. Without testimony that suggested 
that the defendant intentionally drove with "wilful or 
wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property", 
the jury instruction was not proper. 
This is not to say that the defendant's right 
to a lesser included offense instruction is 
absolute or unqualified. * * * * r^ie 
defendant's right to a lesser included offense 
instruction is limited by the evidence presented 
at trial. This limitation requires the 
application of the evidence-based standard 
discussed earlier, which is the appropriate basis 
for determining whether to instruct a jury 
regarding a lesser included offense at the 
defendant's request. 
Baker, 671 P.2d at 157. 
The second prong of the Baker analysis should be 
focused upon here. Under the evidence presented at trial, 
there would have been no "rational basis for a verdict 
acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and 
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convicting him of the included offense." The Baker Court 
stated: 
[T]he court is obligated to instruct on the 
lesser offense only if the evidence offered 
provides a 'rational basis for a verdict 
acquitting the defendant of the offense charged 
and convicting him of the included offense.' * * 
* * The court must only decide whether there is 
a sufficient quantum of evidence presented to 
justify sending the question to the jury. . . . 
Baker, 671 P.2d at 159. 
As the defense argued, and the prosecution agreed, the 
type of traffic offenses observed are made by drivers who 
were not under the influence of alcohol. R.178. 
Similarly, the same kinds of offenses are committed by 
drivers which do not possess the mental intent of "wilful 
and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or 
property". 
The defendant asserts that "[t]here was plenty of 
evidence presented at trial that defendant drove his 
vehicle in an unsafe manner." DB at 20. However, the 
evidence that was presented at trial was insufficient to 
prove this was done with the requisite intent of willful 
or wanton disregard. This was especially true in view of 
the defendant's assertion that diabetes was responsible 
for disorientation leading to the driving violations. The 
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driving pattern observed here would not have risen to the 
level of "wilful and wanton disregard" by itself. 
Under the evidence presented at trial, the finder of 
fact could have found that (1) the defendant drove under 
the influence or (2) the defendant suffered from diabetic 
disorientation. The finder of fact would have been faced 
with an insufficient quantum of evidence on which to make 
a finding as to the defendant's intentional "wilful or 
wanton disregard". Under either theory of the case, the 
prosecution or the defense, a finding of reckless driving 
would have had insufficient evidentiary basis. In this 
regard, the evidence was not ambiguous or subject to an 
alternative interpretation that required the trial court 
to instruct on a lesser offense. See Baker at 159. 
The trial judge properly denied the defendant's 
request for a lesser included offense instruction. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Plaintiff and Appellee 
Salt Lake City respectfully requests that the Court of 
Appeals affirm the defendant's conviction. 
SUBMITTED this tJ\ "ill day of October, 1995. 
WU^ 
A. FISHER 
Attorney for Appellee 
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